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EXEMPT PROPERTY AND BANKRUPTCY:
SECURED AND WAIVER CLAIMS
Hector Currie*

Allowance of secured claims in bankruptcy is governed by
section 57h of the Bankruptcy Act:
"The value of securities held by secured creditors shall
be determined by converting the same into money according to the terms of the agreement pursuant to which such
securities were delivered to such creditors, or by such
creditors and the trustee by agreement, arbitration, compromise, or litigation, as the court may direct, and the
amount of such value shall be credited upon such claims,
and a dividend shall be paid only on the unpaid balance.
Such determination
shall be under the supervision and con1
trol of the court."
This statement of the so-called bankruptcy rule for secured
claims, which differs from the equity or chancery rule applied
in some sorts of non-bankruptcy liquidation where the secured
creditor receives dividends on the full amount of his claim
without deducting the value of his security,2 does not exhaust
the possibilities open in bankruptcy to the secured creditor.
He may prove his claim as unsecured and surrender his security
or, if the security is exclusively in his possession, he may
choose not to prove a claim and, instead, rely on the security.,
Unless the security has become valueless, the creditor should
not waive it by proving an unsecured claim; 4 and unless he is
certain that the value of the security is ample to protect him
fully, he should not fail to prove a claim. In most circumstances
it is advisable for the secured creditor to prove his claim as a
secured claim subject to section 57h.
CLAIMS SECURED BY EXEMPT PROPERTY

If, however, the property to which the security relates was
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 11 U.S.C. § 93h (1964).
2. See United States Nat'l Bank in Johnstown v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 331

U.S. 28 (1947).
3. 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 57.07(3) (1969).
4. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 93a (1964).
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exempt from the claims of creditors generally but was not
exempt from the claims of a defined class of creditors including
the claimant, 5 or if the debtor now bankrupt created a security
right in exempt property for the claimant's benefit where he
was permitted to do so by the local exemption law, 6 the question arises: is the claimant a secured creditor governed by
section 57h or is he not rather, in the bankruptcy meaning,
unsecured-that is, may he not prove, and draw dividends on,
the full amount of his claim, then enforce his security outside
bankruptcy for the unpaid balance? Before this question can be
considered, it is necessary to notice section 70a, section 6, and
section 1 (28) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Section 70a begins:
"The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt . . .shall . . .be
vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt
as of the date of the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, except insofar as it is to property
which is held to be exempt . .
Section 6 provides in part:
"This Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of
the exemptions which are prescribed by the laws of the
United States or by the State laws in force at the time of the
fiiling of the petition in the State wherein they have had
their domicile . . ."
And section 1 (28) provides:
" 'Secured creditor' shall include a creditor who has security
for his debt upon the property of the bankrupt of a nature
to be assignable under this Act or who owns such a debt for
which some endorser, surety, or other person secondarily
liable for the bankrupt has such security upon the bankrupt's assets."9
The bankrupt must claim his exemptions in the schedules
he is required to file in the bankruptcy proceeding.'0 Failure to
make the claim, if not corrected by amendment, amounts to a
5. See LA. CONST. art.

XI. § 2(1-5).

6. See id. § 2(6-7); LA. R.S. 22:647E (1950), as amended (1958).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 110a (1964).
8. Id. § 24.
9. Id.

§ 1(28).

10. Id. § 25a(8).
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waiver of the bankrupt's right of exemption" and it necessarily
destroys the creditor's security in the property supposedly
exempt. 12 But if the exemption properly claimed by the
bankrupt 13 is set apart by the trustee in bankruptcy 14 and this
action is approved by the court, 15 title to the exempt property
does not pass to the trustee and the exempt property constitutes
no part of the bankrupt estate. 16 Does it follow, where a creditor
has security in property determined to be exempt, that his
security is not "upon the property of the bankrupt of a nature
to be assignable under this Act"?
Remington criticizes the phrasing of section 1 (28) as inept,
but adds that " 'assignable under the Act' is construed to mean
'of such nature as to pass to the trustee' under the Act, and
exempt property does not so pass."' 7 This construction has been
the basis of decision in several cases.
In re Anderson, 8 considering the words "of a nature to be
assignable under this Act," concluded that: "They are to be
understood in a broad sense as equivalent to the expression 'of
a nature such that it will pass to the trustee under this act.'
The word 'assignable,' as here used, is probably a heritage from
the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, where at section 14 ... provision is
made for assigning and conveying the estate of the bankrupt
to the assignee provided by the act. Under the present statute,
exempt property does not pass to the trustee. Section 6 .... It is
not assignable under the act. See, also, section 70. . .. "19
The same meaning was given the statutory language by
In re Bailey,20 which held that the mortgagee of an exempt
homestead might prove the entire claim as an unsecured creditor.
And in In re Guilliot2' a pledgee of life insurance policies of
which the proceeds were exempt by local law was likewise
held entitled to allowance of his entire claim. Finally, in
Feder v. John Engelhorn & Sons,2 2 Judge Augustus Hand said
COLLTER, BANKRUPTCY § 6.19 (1969).
Id. § 6.10.
11 U.S.C. § 25a(8) (1964).
Id. § 75a(6).
Id. § 11a(1l).
1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 6.05 (1969).
2 H. REmINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 910 (1956).
11 F.2d 380 (D. Minn. 1926).
Id. at 381.
176 Fed. 990 (D. Utah 1910).
47 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. La. 1942).
202 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1953).

11. 1 W.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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by way of dictum: "After some conflict it now seems clear
that a creditor who has exempt property of the bankrupt for
security is not a secured creditor and may prove his claim in
full."2

Other cases have decided that where a creditor with security
on exempt property proved his entire claim in his debtor's
bankruptcy as unsecured, he did not thereby waive his security
24
and could resort to the exempt property outside bankruptcy in effect recognizing his status as an unsecured creditor. One
who is a secured creditor within the definition of section 1(28)
ordinarily is held to waive the security by filing his claim as
unsecured.25
Apart from reliance on the statutory language to support
its conclusion that the mortgagee of an exempt homestead is
not a secured creditor and may have a claim allowed in the full
amount without deduction for the mortgage, In re Anderson20
also argued that any other result would be unfair to the bankrupt. A requirement that the mortgagee reduce his claim by the
value of the homestead would increase the dividend each general
creditor received and would thus be tantamount to using the
homestead in part for the payment of general claims. 27 This

28
argument was adopted by the court that decided In re Guilliot.

Three cases 29 that applied section 57h to a creditor with a
lien on exempt property of the bankrupt were decided without
reference to the definition of "secured creditor" in section 1 (28),
an omission that weakens the force of those decisions.3 0 The
creditor of In re Cale,31 with a valid judgment lien on the bankrupt's exempt homestead, obtained an order of special execution
on the homestead from a state court after its bankruptcy claim
was reduced by the value of the homestead. The debtor then
took an appeal to the highest court in the state and the creditor,
23. Id. at 412.
24. Robinson v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 28 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Okla. 1939),
modified on other grounds and aff'd on rehearing, 31 F. Supp. 350 (N.D. Okla.
1940); Watters v. Hedgpeth, 172 N.C. 310, 90 S.E. 314 (1916).
25. 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 57.07[3.11

(1969).

26. 11 F.2d 380 (D. Minn. 1926).
27. Id. at 381.
28. 47 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. La. 1942).
29. In re Cale, 182 Fed. 439 (D. Minn. 1910), aff'd, 191 Fed. 31 (8th Cir.
1911); In re Lantzenheimer, 124 Fed. 716 (N.D. Iowa 1903); In re Little, 110
Fed. 621 (N.D. Iowa 1901).
30. Cf. Note, 17 MINN. L. REV. 47, 53 (1932).
31. 182 Fed. 439 (D. Minn. 1910), afl'd, 191 Fed. 31 (8th Cir. 1911).
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as protection against the consequence of a possible reversal of
the order of special execution, appealed the order of the bankruptcy court that had reduced the amount of the claim. The
district court and the court of appeals affirmed, the latter stating
that the question whether one who holds security on exempt
property of a bankrupt is a secured creditor within the meaning
of section 1 (28) had not been argued in the case and would not
be determined. 2 In re Lantzenheimer asserts: "The rule contended for by the creditor would result, in the great majority
of the cases, in giving to the creditor a greater share in the estate
of the debtor, without really benefitting the bankrupt; and I
see no good reason why the court should interpolate into clause
h of section 57 an exception not named therein, to wit, that if
the security held by the creditor is upon exempt property, the
creditor can prove his claim for the whole amount due."'33 To
the extent to which the creditor is paid from the estate, however,
he will not have to resort to the exempt property after bankruptcy, with resultant benefit to the bankrupt, and good reason
against the use of section 57h might have been found in section 1 (28).
Of cases applying section 57h to the creditor with a lien on
exempt property, only Feney v. Poor 34 has attempted to analyze
the language of section 1 (28). The definition of secured creditor,
said the court, "refers to the nature of the property, and, if it
is such as to be assignable under the act, the fact that it includes
exemptions under the state laws . . . could not affect its nature
and make it nonassignable. The act provides that the bankrupt
shall make claim under oath to his exemptions . . . and also
makes it the duty of the trustee to set apart the bankrupt's
exemptions ... and makes it the duty of the judge to determine
all claims of bankrupts to their exemptions. These provisions
clearly indicate that the whole estate of the bankrupt is assigned, under the law, to the trustee, and that then the claim
of the bankrupt is to be made for his exemptions, which are to
be set apart by the trustee and determined by the court. The
fact that the debtor has a homestead right in a tract of land
does not change the nature of the property and make it nonassignable. In re Sisler (D.C.) 96 Fed. 402. The homestead right
may be abandoned, or, if there be no objection or application
32. 191 Fed. 31, 33 (8th Cir. 1911).
33. 124 Fed. 716, 717 (N.D. Iowa 1903).
34. 121 Fed. 739 (6th Cir. 1903).
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on the part of the bankrupt to have the homestead set apart
to him, the property may be sold, and the proceeds distributed
among his creditors. Collier on Bankruptcy ... The property is
of a nature to pass to the trustee ....-"5 But if the homestead is

not abandoned and the bankrupt claims his exemption, the
property does not pass to the trustee.8 6 And the only case cited
for the conclusion that exempt property is assignable under the
Act, In re Sisler, 7 held that where the debtor had waived his
homestead right in favor of a creditor, the homestead would
pass to the trustee in bankruptcy so as to enable him to enforce
the creditor's right against the property-a procedure that the
Supreme Court was shortly to condemn.-8 Collier on Bankruptcy
speaks of "a rather free interpretation of the words 'of a nature
to be assignable,' contained in the statutory definition"3 9-a
reference apparently to In re Anderson."' It appears that In re
Anderson made better sense of section 1 (28) than did Fenley v.
Poor.41
The latest case to deal with the problem, In re Cain,42 held
that a creditor to which exempt life insurance policies had been
assigned was a secured creditor and must reduce its claim by
the value of the security. The court cited Collier's Bankruptcy
Manual section 57.04 and said that it was disposed to follow what
8
"Collier states to be the majority view."'
Collier in fact has made conflicting statements. The first is
found in Volume One of the treatise: "The decisions are sharply
divided on the question of whether a creditor is deemed to be
secured if his security interest encumbers exempt property, but
the view which reaches the negative result is currently favored
by the courts." Citation follows to In re Anderson and similar
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 740.
11 U.S.C. § ll0a (1964).
96 Fed. 402 (W.D. Va 1899).
Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903).

39. 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 1.28 (1969).

40. 11 F.2d 380 (D. Minn. 1926).
41. Cf. J. MAcLAcKLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 167 (1956):
"The Bankruptcy Act says that a secured creditor shall include a creditor
who has security for his debt upon the property of the bankrupt of a nature
'to be assignable under this Act.' This definition, taken in connection with
the provision of section 70a that the trustee Is vested with the title of the
bankrupt, except to property held to be exempt, by clear Implication excludes
exempt property, as such property is not 'of a nature to be assignable under
this Act' to the trustee."
42. 291 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Texas 1968).
43. Id. at 2.
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cases. 44 And this language comes from Volume Three: "A minority view even refuses to consider a creditor as 'secured' if he
holds exempt property of the bankrupt. The better and majority
view, however, is to the contrary." 45
Remington says without self-contradiction: "The weight of
authority is to the effect that security on exempt property of
the bankrupt is not on property of the bankrupt 'of a nature
to be assignable under the Act,' and that a creditor holding only
such security is not a 'secured creditor' of the bankrupt and is
entitled to allowance of his claim in full without regard to his
security." 46 It is perhaps inexact to speak of the weight of
authority where cases few in number are almost evenly balanced, but Remington expresses what seems the preferable
view.47
CLAIMS WITH WAIVER OF

EXEMPTION

Instead of security on exempt property of the bankrupt,
the creditor may have merely a waiver of exemption.4 For a
time it was thought that the bankruptcy court might administer
exempt property for the benefit of such a creditor 49 or of one
excepted by statute from the exemption, 0 but this idea died
44. 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 1.28 (1969).

45. 3 id. § 57.07.
46. 2 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 910 (1956).
47. See Note, 17 MINN. L. REv. 47, 52-54 (1932): "The status as against
the estate in bankruptcy of a creditor whose debt is secured by a claim
against property of the bankrupt which is exempt under the Act has been

a troublesome problem and has given rise to an irreconcilable conflict
among the few cases that have passed on the question. A minority number
of cases have held that such a creditor is not secured within the meaning
of the definition in the Act and allow him to share in the general estate of
In view of the fact that the result reached
the bankrupt as unsecured ....
-by this construction accords with the express policy of the bankruptcy law,
which is to preserve the bankrupt's rights to exemptions and make such
property unavailable to the general creditors of the estate, the rule adopted
in the minority group of cases seems to be the more justifiable." Collier
cites this Note as "supporting the current trend," then adds: "But it would
seem that the inequality thus created is contrary to the policy of the
Bankruptcy Act, while the bankrupt himself is not benefitted." 1 W. COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY § 1.28 n.15 (1969).
48. See LA. CONST. art XI, § 3; LA. R.S. 22:647E (1950), as amended (1958).
Some states permit contractual waiver of exemption in favor of a particular
creditor, but many states hold that such an executory waiver is against
public policy. Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1459, 1494-97 (1959). See also Succession of Onorato, 219 La. 1, 50 So.2d 804 (1951).
49. In re Sisler, 96 Fed. 402 (W.D. Va. 1899); In re Woodruff, 96 Fed.
317 (S.D. Ga. 1899); In re Garden, 93 Fed. 423 (N.D. Ala. 1899).
50. In re Boyd, 120 Fed. 999 (N.D. Iowa 1903).
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with Lockwood v. Exchange Bank.41 In the Lockwood case, the
Supreme Court held that, as exempt property did not pass to
the trustee, the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction over exempt
property other than to set it aside, but that discharge of the
bankrupt should be postponed long enough to enable the waiver
creditor to take whatever action was necessary, in state court,
to make good his right. 52 The Supreme Court added: "As, in
the case at bar, the entire property which the bankrupt owned
is within the exemption of the state law, it becomes unnecessary to consider what, if any, remedy might be available in the
court of bankruptcy for the benefit of general creditors, in order
to prevent the creditor holding the waiver as to exempt property from taking a dividend on his whole claim from the general
assets, and thereafter availing himself of the right resulting
from the waiver to proceed against exempt property." 8 The
issue reserved in Lockwood has been considered by several courts.
In re Meredith" held that as the waiver of homestead was
in the nature of a security, 5 the claim of the waiver creditor
was subject to section 57h and it could be allowed only after
deducting the value to be received from the homestead. No
mention was made of section 1 (28). In a later case, In re
Loden,5 the same court said: "It is not at all clear to me that,
because a creditor has proven his claim as unsecured in the
bankruptcy court, he may not, notwithstanding this, assert whatever peculiar right he may have against the homestead exemption."51? Though the court seemed to find no incongruity, this
language necessarily casts doubt on the decision in the Meredith
case.
Schloss v. Unsell5s permitted partners who were creditors
with a valid waiver of homestead and who had proved their
entire claim in bankruptcy as unsecured and had received substantial dividends, to enforce their right to the unpaid balance
51. 190 U.S. 294 (1903).
52. For criticism of Lockwood v. Exchange
tion of Exemption, in Bankruptcy, 45 IowA L.
ment, 68 YALu L.J. 1459, 1476-78 (1959). The rule
lished." 1 W. COLLMR, BANKRUPTCY § 6.05 (1969).
53. 190 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1903).
54. 144 Fed. 230 (N.D. Ga. 1906).
55. Bell v. Dawson Grocery Co., 120 Ga. 628,
56. 184 Fed. 965 (N.D. Ga. 1910).
57. Id. at 966.
58. 114 Kan. 69, 216 P. 1091 (1923).

Bank, see Kennedy, LimitaRv. 445, 462-9 (1960); Comof the case is "firmly estab-

48 S.E. 150 (1904).
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against the homestead in a state court. Similar in effect is Johnson v. Turnholt.59
The court in Schloss v. Unsell distinguished the consequences
for a lien creditor of proof of his claim as unsecured according
to whether the property subject to the lien was or was not
exempt. Where it was not exempt, the creditor would lose the
benefit of his lien. Where it was exempt, his lien would not be
affected. "In such a case, the exempt property might be taken
by the lien creditor and applied to the payment of his claim
without reference to the bankruptcy proceeding. If the lien creditor proved his claim in the bankruptcy proceeding and received
part payment out of the assets, the debtor's exempt property
would to that extent be relieved from the payment of the claim.
The creditors would have no cause of complaint, because they
cannot look to the exempt property for the payment of their
claim, nor compel other creditors to resort to that property and
thereby leave a greater amount in the assets of the bankrupt
estate. The debtor would have no cause for complaint, because
the claim against the exempt property would be reduced by the
amount received.""
If a creditor with a lien on exempt property may prove his
claim in full, the same should be true a fortiori of a creditor with
only a waiver of exemption. This has been denied, however, by
Professor Kennedy: "It is true that some courts allow a creditor
holding security against property otherwise exempt to prove
in full, i.e., without reducing the amount of his claim by the
value of such security. Whatever may be said as to the soundness of that rule, however, it constitutes no embarrassment to
the argument that an unsecured creditor with a mere waiver is
assisted in achieving a preferential position vis-e-vis the other
unsecured creditors in the debtor's property when the bankruptcy court allows such a creditor to prove in full and simultaneously to pursue the exempt property. Moreover, the rule
respecting treatment of holders of security in exempt property
affords no support whatever for saying that exempt property
which is subject to the claims of one or more unsecured creditors
nevertheless does not belong to the bankrupt estate. Certainly
the trustee's position in respect to the portion of exempt property vulnerable to unsecured creditors' claims is quite different
59. 199 Iowa 1331, 203 N.W. 715 (1925).
60. 114 Kan. 69, 71-72, 216 P. 1091, 1092 (1923).
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from that which he holds in relation to exempt property subject
to a valid security interest. It may be argued of course that a
waiver holder has a right which he has bargained for and which
he ought to be able to assert as against the trustee in bankruptcy
in the same manner as a secured creditor's rights are respected.
The objectives of bankruptcy administration are not served, however, by extension of the rights of secured and priority claimants
at the expense of the general creditors and the debtor.""' One cannot agree that allowing a waiver creditor to prove his claim in
full and to pursue the exempt property impairs the rights either
of the debtor or of the general creditors, 62 or that the objectives of
bankruptcy administration can be defined without reference to
the recognition of state exemption policies in section 6.
Collier criticizes the holding of Schloss v. Unsell as "inequitable and contrary to the philosophy of bankruptcy distribution. ' 63 The criticism fails to take adequate account of section
6, section 70a, and particularly section 1 (28). "Creditors holding
waivers of exemptions are not secured creditors within the
definition of ... the Bankruptcy Act. .... ,,64
61. Kennedy, Limitation of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IowA L. REV.

445, 464 (1960).
62. "A waiver in favor of a particular creditor cannot be asserted for
the benefit of other creditors. Likewise, a waiver of homestead rights in
favor of all creditors cannot be accomplished through a waiver made to one
creditor only, nor can the latter form of waiver entitle all creditors to
marshal securities or funds."

1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 6.10 (1969).

63. Id. at 840.
64. J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 167 (1956).

